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This appendix reports in detail our data collection methods, provides additional details 
about our empirical tests, and includes additional tests. Section A.1 provides detailed 
information about our dataset, and presents correlations between our dependent variable 
and our independent variables. Section A.2 presents the full regression tables of our main 
tests. Section 3 includes full results of our robustness tests, and Section A.4 provides 
more details about the way in which we test the four different explanations for our major 
findings. 
A.1 Data description 
A.1.1 Generating the dataset 
Our unit of analysis is individual i from country j in survey wave t. We utilize all the 
World Values Survey waves available so far (the surveys span the period from 1981 
through 2013, and cover 98 countries or territorial units1). We use the longitudinal data 
obtained here http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp (file 
name 1981_2014 v.18_04_2015.csv). This dataset does not include responses from 
Sweden in waves 1 and 4, and from the US in wave 4. These countries are included in the 
European Values Study (EVS) longitudinal dataset, and they were omitted from the WVS 
longitudinal dataset to allow for easier integration between the WVS and the EVS). We 
add the responses from Sweden in waves 1 and 4, and the responses from the US in wave 																																								 																					1	Hong	Kong	and	the	Palestinian	Authority	are	also	included	in	the	survey.	
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4 to the WVS longitudinal dataset using the WVS integrated datasets for these waves 
(WV1_IntegratedData_stata_dta_v_2014_06_17.csv and 
WV4_IntegratedData_stata_dta_v_2014_06_17.csv, respectively).  
 Table A.1 below lists all the countries and units included in the WVS waves 1 
through 6, the survey years if each country, the percentage of respondents who expressed 
willingness to fight for their country, and the number of respondents from each country. 
The Table also presents what percentage of the dataset each country constitutes.  
 We merged the WVS data with several other datasets to obtain country-level 
controls. We also control for individual characteristics of the respondents using the 
information provided in the WVS. We provide description of the controls below.  
Table A.1: List of countries and units in WVS waves 1-6.  
Country Survey years Willingness to 
Fight “yes” 
share 
Respondents % of dataset 
Albania 1998, 2002 0.76 1,999 0.58 
Algeria 2002*, 2013 0.83 2,482 0.72 
Andorra 2005 0.41 1,003 0.29 
Argentina 1984, 1991, 
1995, 1999, 
2006, 2013 
0.59 6,398 1.85 
Armenia 1997, 2011 0.79 3,100 0.9 
Australia 1981, 1995, 
2005, 2012 
0.69 6,174 1.79 
Azerbaijan 1997, 2011 0.87 3,004 0.87 
Bahrain 2014 0.51 1,200 0.35 
Bangladesh 1996, 2002 0.92 3,025 0.88 
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Belarus 1990, 1996, 
2011 
0.86 4,642 1.34 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1998, 2001 0.77 2,000 0.58 
Brazil 1991, 2006, 
2014 
0.48 4,768 1.38 
Bulgaria 1997, 2005 0.68 2,073 0.6 
Burkina Faso 2007 0.85 1,534 0.44 
Canada 2000, 2006 0.62 4,095 1.19 
Chile 1990, 1996, 
2000, 2006, 
2011 
0.66 5,700 1.65 
China 1990, 1995, 
2001, 2007, 
2012 
0.88 7,791 2.25 
Colombia 1997*, 1998*, 
2005*, 2012 
0.73 10,562 3.06 
Croatia 1996 0.8 1,196 0.35 
Cyprus 2006, 2011 0.79 2,050 0.59 
Czech Republic 1991, 1998 0.6 2,071 0.6 
Dominican 
Republic 
1996 0.79 417 0.12 
Ecuador 2013 0.67 1,202 0.35 
Egypt 2001*, 2008, 
2013 
0.72 7,574 2.19 
El Salvador 1999 0.69 1,254 0.36 
Estonia 1996, 2011 0.67 2,554 0.74 
Ethiopia 2007 0.77 1,500 0.43 
Finland 1981, 1996, 
2005 
0.84 3,004 0.87 
France 2006 0.6 1,001 0.29 
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Georgia 1996, 2009, 
2014 
0.74 4,710 1.36 
Germany 1997, 2006, 
2013 
0.43 6,136 1.78 
Ghana 2007, 2012 0.79 3,086 0.89 
Guatemala 2004 0.7 1,000 0.29 
Hong Kong 2005, 2013 0.49 2,252 0.65 
Hungary 1982, 1998, 
2009 
0.72 3,121 0.9 
India 1990, 1995, 
2001, 2006, 
2014 
0.85 10,124 2.93 
Indonesia 2001*, 2006 0.92 3,015 0.87 
Iran 2000*, 2007 0.81 5,199 1.5 
Iraq 2004, 2006, 
2012 
0.44 6,226 1.8 
Israel 2001 0.8 1,199 0.35 
Italy 2005 0.43 1,012 0.29 
Japan 1981, 1990, 
1995, 2000, 
2005, 2010 
0.26 8,170 2.36 
Jordan 2001*, 2007, 
2014 
0.89 3,623 1.05 
Kazakhstan 2011 0.77 1,500 0.43 
Kuwait 2014 0.81 1,303 0.38 
Kyrgyzstan 2003, 2011 0.78 2,543 0.74 
Latvia 1996 0.68 1,200 0.35 
Lebanon 2013 0.53 1,200 0.35 
Libya 2014 0.71 2,131 0.62 
Lithuania 1997 0.68 1,009 0.29 
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Macedonia 1998, 2001 0.82 2,050 0.59 
Malaysia 2006, 2012 0.8 2,501 0.72 
Mali 2007 0.88 1,534 0.44 
Mexico 1981, 1990, 
1995, 1996, 
2000, 2005, 
2012 
0.76 10,827 3.13 
Moldova 1996, 2002 0.77 3,038 0.88 
Montenegro 1996, 2001 0.7 1,300 0.38 
Morocco 2001, 2007, 
2011 
0.83 3,651 1.06 
Netherlands 2006, 2012 0.49 2,952 0.85 
New Zealand 1998, 2004, 
2011 
0.63 2,996 0.87 
Nigeria 1990, 1995, 
2000*, 2011 
0.66 6,778 1.96 
Norway 1996, 2007 0.88 2,152 0.62 
Pakistan 1997*, 2001*, 
2012 
0.89 3,933 1.14 
Palestine 2013 0.66 1,000 0.29 
Peru 1996, 2001, 
2006, 2012 
0.79 5,422 1.57 
Philippines 1996, 2001, 
2012 
0.86 3,600 1.04 
Poland 1989, 1997, 
2005, 2012 
0.82 4,057 1.17 
Puerto Rico 1995, 2001 0.73 1,884 0.55 
Qatar 2010 0.98 1,060 0.31 
Romania 1998, 2005, 
2012  
0.75 4,518 1.31 
Russia 1990, 1995, 0.8 8,534 2.47 
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2006, 2011 
Rwanda 2007, 2012 0.75 3,034 0.88 
Saudi Arabia 2003*  1,502 0.43 
Singapore 2002, 2012 0.81 3,484 1.01 
Slovakia 1990, 1998 0.64 1,561 0.45 
Slovenia 1995, 2005, 
2011 
0.76 3,113 0.9 
South Africa 1982, 1990, 
1996, 2001, 
2006, 2013 
0.65 16,786 4.86 
South Korea 1982, 1990, 
1996, 2001, 
2005, 2010 
0.79 7,070 2.05 
Spain 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2007, 
2011 
0.49 6,319 1.83 
Sweden 1981, 1996, 
1999*, 2006, 
2011 
0.85 5,187 1.5 
Switzerland 1989, 1996, 
2007 
0.71 3,853 1.11 
Taiwan 1994, 2006, 
2012 
0.86 3,245 0.94 
Tanzania 2001 0.93 1,171 0.34 
Thailand 2013 0.9 2,734 0.79 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
2006, 2011 0.66 2,001 0.58 
Tunisia 2013 0.77 1,205 0.35 
Turkey 1990, 1996, 
2001*, 2007, 
2011 
0.93 9,289 2.69 
Uganda 2001 0.65 1,002 0.29 
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Notes: * - Willingness to fight question not included in the survey 
A.1.2 Dependent variable 
Our main dependent variable is respondents’ willingness to fight for their country, 
measured using their responses to the following WVS question (variable E012 in the 
longitudinal dataset): 
Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, 
would you be willing to fight for your country? 
The possible answers to this question are ‘yes’ and ‘no’. We code the ‘yes’ answers as 1, 
and the ‘no’ answers as 0. Other answers -- ‘Missing; Unknown’ (0.3%), ‘Not asked in 
survey’ (8.6%), ‘Not applicable’ (0.01%), ‘No answer’ (2.4%), and ‘Don’t know’ (8.4%) 
Ukraine 1996, 2006, 
2011 
0.73 5,311 1.54 
United 
Kingdom 
1998*, 2005 0.62 2,134 0.62 
United States of 
America 
1981, 1995, 
1999, 2006, 
2011 
0.69 8,548 2.47 
Uruguay 1996, 2006, 
2011 
0.55 3,000 0.87 
Uzbekistan 2011 0.94 1,500 0.43 
Venezuela 1996, 2000 0.84 2,400 0.69 
Vietnam 2001, 2006 0.96 2,495 0.72 
Yemen 2014 0.77 1,000 0.29 
Yugoslavia 1996, 2001, 
2005 
0.73 3,700 1.07 
Zambia 2007 0.65 1,500 0.43 
Zimbabwe 2001, 2012 0.54 2,502 0.72 
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-- are coded as missing. The overall percentage of missing values is 19.8%, of which 
8.6% is due to surveys in which this question is not included. 
 The percentage of each country’s ‘yes’ answers is in Table A.1.  Figure A.1 
depicts the distribution of answers over time. This figure shows that ‘yes’ is the mode 
answer to the willingness to fight question during this period. There are very small 
fluctuations, but overall it seems that in each wave the percentage of ‘yes’ (among the 
non-missing responses) is above 70%.  
Figure A.1: Answers to the willingness to fight question over time
 
Figure A.2 presents a scatterplot of all countries in all waves. It is particularly 
helpful for detecting outliers. It easy to see that there is an unusually low percentage of 
affirmative answers in Japan. Other countries, such as Turkey, have a consistently high 
percentage of such answers. This suggests that there are time-invariant country-level 
trends that may affect some of the responses. There are also countries in which the 
	 10	
percentage of ‘yes’ responses varies over time. For example, Spain experiences a drop in 
the percentage of ‘yes’ responses in the fourth wave compared to the third wave. 
Similarly, over 90% of respondents in Sweden replied ‘yes’ in the third wave, but this 
number dropped to below 80% in the sixth wave. This suggests that there are time-
varying country-level characteristics that affect these responses.  
Figure A.2: Answers to the willingness to fight question by country over time
 
A.1.3 Main independent variable – individual income 
We measure income using answers to the following question: 
On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 
10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what 
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group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all 
wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. (Code one number):  
Lowest group  Highest group 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10  
We then convert these responses to quintiles by combining the first and the 
second deciles into first quintile; the third and the fourth deciles into second quintile; the 
fifth and the sixth deciles into third quintile; the seventh and the eighth deciles into fourth 
quintile; and the ninth and the tenth deciles into fifth quintile. Based on these quintiles, 
we create five binary quintile indicators, and use them as variables in our model 
(!"#$%#&'()).  
The self-reported nature of these income quintiles raises the question of whether 
they are a valid measure of our variable of interest – income. While we cannot directly 
ascertain to what extent these answers are accurate and precise, we validate this measure 
by exploring its correlation with other known correlates of income – education and 
employment status.  
Looking at the correlation coefficients and their statistical significance suggest 
that the self-reported income deciles are a valid measure of income. There is a positive 
correlation between being employed full time and reporting higher income (correlation 
coefficient is 0.17, p-value=0.000). Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between 
those who identify as unemployed and income quintile (correlation coefficient is -0.10, p-
value=0.000). Finally, there is a positive correlation between having a college degree and 
reporting higher income (correlation coefficient is 0.22, p-value=0.000). Based on the 
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correlation between self-reported income, education, and employment status, we 
conclude that self-reported income is a valid measure for individual income.  
Income quintile appears to be uncorrelated with willingness to fight. Figure A.3 
shows that individuals from different income quintiles are very similar in their 
willingness to fight. The only statistically significant difference (p<0.05) is between the 
first and the third quintiles, but the substantive difference is negligible (72.1% vs 72.6%, 
p=0.03). 
Figure A.3: Willingness to fight and income quintile
 
A.1.4 Main independent variable – country-level income inequality  
Our main measure of income inequality is the Net Gini variable from SWIID (Solt 2009). 
It ranges between 0 and 1 (originally it ranges between 0 and 100, but we rescale it to 
make it easier to depict the coefficients). Net Gini measures net-income (post tax) Gini. 
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SWIID data are available for most countries in the WVS. SWIID inequality data are not 
available for the following country-years that are in WVS: Montenegro (1996), Russia 
(1990), Libya (2014), Iraq (2004, 2006, 2012), Saudi Arabia (2003), Kuwait (2014), 
Bahrain (2014), Qatar (2010), and Palestine (2013). We omit these country-years from 
our analysis. 
In addition, we collect data on gini coefficient from the Luxembourg Income 
Studies (LIS) Inequality and Poverty Key Figures (http://www.lisdatacenter.org/lis-ikf-
webapp/app/search-ikf-figures). There is a very high correlation between Net Gini and 
the LIS gini coefficient (correlation coefficient is 0.97, p=0.000). There is a somewhat 
weaker correlation between the Market Gini variable from SWIID and the LIS gini 
coefficient (correlation coefficient is 0.52, p-value=0.000).  
LIS data are available for only 33 countries out of the 96 in the WVS data. Using 
LIS as our primary measure would have restricted the scope of our analysis. The 
advantage of LIS is that it is based on household surveys, whereas SWIID is created 
using multiple imputations. We use the Net Gini from SWIID as our main measure 
because of the greater coverage that it provides. In some of our robustness checks we use 
the LIS gini coefficient. 
Looking at the correlation between Net Gini and willingness to fight (Figure A.4) 
suggests that the overall relation appears to be slightly negative, though the Pearson 
correlation coefficient is statistically not significant. This figure shows that some 
countries are potential outliers in terms of their Net Gini, and to address this issue in 
robustness tests we drop country-years with very high and very low levels of inequality 
(Gini net index below the 25th percentile or above the 75th percentile, respectively). We 
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also repeat our tests dropping county-years with unusually high and low level of 
willingness to fight (below the 10th percentile or above the 90th percentile of the 
country-level Willingness to Fight).  
Figure A.4: Willingness to fight and Net Gini
 
A.1.4 Control variables 
We control for a wide range of individual-level and country-level time-varying controls. 
Individual-level controls 
First, we control for gender, and also focus on estimating our models using 
answers of male respondents. As we highlights in the paper, gender is especially 
important in this context because in most of the countries women are exempt from 
compulsory military service. Males, however, can at least in principle be called to serve 
even in countries without conscription army.  Gender overall is well distributed in our 
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data, with a slight over-representation of females (the dataset contains 47.6% male 
respondents, 51.1% of female respondents, and the rest choose not to report their gender). 
Gender appears to be correlated with responses to the willingness to fight question – 
female respondents are about 12 percentage points less likely to indicate that they are 
willing to fight for their country: 66% vs 78%, p-value<0.000 (see Figure A.5).  
Second, we control for age and age2. Similarly to gender, individuals who are 
relatively old may say that they are not willing to fight simply because they do not 
anticipate being drafted. Figure A.6  presents the relationship between age groups and 
willingness to fight. The Figure suggests that the willingness to fight is the highest among 
the youngest respondents (age<18), and the lowest in the oldest age group (age>45) (78% 
vs 70%, p<0.000), and that in between, the willingness to fight is increasing in age. The 
minimum age to participate in WVS is 18, but despite this, in our dataset there are 
respondents who are as young as 13 (2,065 respondents are below 18; most of them -- 
1,671 – are 17 years old). In our empirical tests we control for respondent’s age, and 
repeat the analysis only on respondents between the ages of 18 and 45, dropping those 
who do not expect to take part in a war. 
We also control for family status, and distinguish among those who are single, 
married or living together, and divorces, separated, or widowed. Figure A.7 depicts the 
percentage of those who are willing and not willing to fight for their country across these 
three different groups. Married respondents exhibit a slightly higher willingness to fight 
than single respondents (72% vs 74%), and both of these groups express a higher 
willingness to fight than divorced, separated, or widowed respondents (64%). The 
differences among the three groups are statistically significant (p<0.000). Married 
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individuals may appear to be more willing to fight than others because of other 
characteristics, such as age, rather than their marital status. Therefore, we do not make 
any inferences based on these descriptive statistics. We present them here to get a better 
sense of our data. 
Figure A.5: Willingness to fight and gender
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Figure A.6: Willingness to fight and age
 
 
Figure A.7: Willingness to fight and marital status
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An additional individual-level attribute that we control for is religiosity. We distinguish 
between secular and religious respondents using a WVS question that asks the 
respondents to indicate their religious denomination (variable F025 in the longitudinal 
dataset). Possible denominations are Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jew, 
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Other. It is also possible to respond ‘do not belong to a 
denomination.’  We code respondents who name a denomination as religious, and those 
who indicate that they do not belong to a denomination as secular. Figure A.8 presents 
the distribution of willingness to fight answers across secular and religious respondents. 
Respondents who indicate that they do not belong to any denomination are less likely to 
say that are willing to fight for their country than respondents who indicate religious 
affiliation (66% vs 74%, p<0.000).  
 In some specifications, we also control for whether a respondents belongs to a 
linguistic minority group. We focus on language because it is a frequent attribute of 
ethnicity, and also because thee WVS asks which language respondents speak at home 
(variable G016 in the longitudinal dataset). We use the CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2098.html) to code 
whether a respondent’s language constitutes a minority language. We code minority 
language as (1) unofficial language; and (2) not one of the two most frequent languages 
in the country. Figure A.9 presents the differences between minority and non-minority 
respondents with respect to their willingness to fight for their country. Respondents who 
speak a minority language at home are slightly more likely to say they are not willing to 
fight for their country, but the differences are very small. We do not control for this 
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variable as part of our main regressions because there are many missing values in this 
variable (22.6% missing) as this question is not included in many surveys.  
Figure A.8: Willingness to fight and religiosity
 
Figure A.9: Willingness to fight and linguistic minority status
 
	 20	
 Finally, in robustness checks we control for respondents’ education level. This is 
based on variable X025 in the WVS that asks respondents to name their highest 
educational level that they attained. We do not control for this variable in the main tests 
because household income is correlated with education (the correlation coefficient 
between having a university degree and income is 0.3, p-value=0.000). In Figure A.10 we 
present the distribution of the willingness to fight answers across different levels of 
education. The figure shows some variation in answers. The overall relationship appears 
to be positive – respondents with less than elementary education are less willing to fight 
for their country than respondents with academic degrees. However, the relationship is 
not monotonic – those with some university education or with academic degrees are 
slightly more willing to fight for their country than those with secondary education.  
Figure A.10: Willingness to fight and education
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Country-level time-varying controls 
We control for a wide range of time-varying country-level controls. In most cases, these 
control variables are measured one year prior to the survey. In a small number of cases, 
where data are not available, we lag by more than one year. For example, the last 
inequality data for Trinidad and Tobago are available for 2005, while the last WVS 
survey in that country is in 2011. We use the 2005 inequality data to estimate 2011 
responses. For the same reason, we use the 2006 inequality data for Ghana to analyze the 
2012 survey. Likewise, analysis of 2014 surveys relies on country-level controls that are 
more than one year lagged because not all variables are available for 2013.  
Figure A.2 above suggests that there are country-level variations in the level of 
willingness to fight that need to be accounted for. We therefore collect data on a wide 
range of country-level controls, and include also country fixed effects to account for 
time-invariant country-level factors.  
 One variable we control for is regime type, measured using democracy and 
autocracy scores from Polity IV dataset (policy4v2012.csv file). As we explain in the 
main text, our democracy score ranges from 0 to 1, and is calculated as  
*'+,-./-01,345 = *'+,-./-0	8-,.'1,345 −	:"%,-./-0	8-,.'1,345 	+ 2020  
Plotting the percentage of respondents willing to fight for their country and country’s 
democracy score suggests that these variables are negatively associated (Figure A.11). 
Pearson correlation coefficient between democracy score and the share of “yes” in 
country-year is -0.37, p-value=0.000.  However, it seems that this relationship may be 
driven by several outliers – such as Germany and Japan – that have a high democracy 
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score and an unusually low rate of willingness to fight. Thus, in our empirical tests we 
include country fixed effects, and in robustness tests exclude various outliers. 
Figure A.11 : Willingness to fight and democracy
 
Figure A.12 suggests that there may be a country-level positive association between 
population size and the willingness to fight. This association, however, is mainly due to 
China and India – two countries with large population and a relatively high level of 
willingness to fight. In fact, the Pearson correlation coefficient is negative, and 
statistically not significant (R=-0.01, p=0.86). Nonetheless, we control for population size 
in our regressions by including the log of population on the right-hand-side of the 
equation. We obtain data on population size from the Penn World Tables (PWT) dataset, 
version 7.1. 
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Figure A.12: Willingness to fight and population size
 
We also control for country-level GDP using data from PWT 7.1. We calculate 
GDP by multiplying the –rgdpch- variable by population × 1000 (population is reported 
in thousands). Looking at the association between GDP and mean willingness to fight in 
Figure A.13 suggests that there is a negative association, but it may be driven by cases of 
the US, Japan, and Germany – countries with high GDP and a medium-low level of 
willingness to fight. This again suggests the importance of including country fixed-
effects, and conducting robustness checks by excluding outliers.  
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Figure A.13: Willingness to fight and GDP
 
We also control for past participation in conflict. We use the UCDP Monadic 
Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset, 1946-2014 
(http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/UCDP_monadic_conflict_onset_and_incide
nce_dataset/) and the MID Dataset v4.01 (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/news/mid-
data-set-v4-01-available). Using these sources, we code conflict as equals 1 if the 
respondent’s country had an intrastate conflict with above 25 death, or an interstate 
dispute at hostility level 4 or above in any of the 5 years preceding the survey. Figure 
A.14 suggests that country’s involvement in conflict during five years preceding the 
survey slightly increases the percentage of those who are willing to fight.  
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Figure A.14: Willingness to fight and conflict
 
In addition, we control for whether a respondent’s country has a conscription 
army using data from the CIA World Factbook and from World Survey of Conscription 
and Conscientious Objection to Military Service (1 These data are available here: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html, and here: 
http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/).  
Figure A.15 depicts the distribution of willingness to fight in conscription and 
non-conscription army countries. It suggests that there is a slightly higher percentage of 
those willing to fight in countries with conscription. 
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Figure A.15 : Conscription military and willingness to fight
 
In some of our regressions reported below, we also include country level ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization computed by Roeder (http://pages.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm).  This 
variable is measured in 1961 and in 1985, but it does not vary by much. Thus, we do not 
include it in our main estimations, where we use country fixed effect. The inclusion of 
fixed effects effectively control for this variable. Figure A.16 shows that there is a 
positive relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1961 and the willingness 
to fight on behalf of that country. This relationship, however, is barely statistically-
significant (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.13, p=0.07). 
	 27	
Figure A.16 : Willingness to fight and ethnolinguistic fractionalization
 
A.2 Summary statistics 
Table A. 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables we use in our empirical tests.  
Table A. 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean St. d. Min Max N  
Individual-level variables 
Willingness to 
fight 
0.72 0.45 0 1 277,325 
Income quintile 2.58 1.17 1 5 312,053 
Female 0.52 0.5 0 1 340,825 
Age 40.83 16.15 14 99 341,342 
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Single, never 
married 
0.25 0.43 0 1 340,669 
Married or 
living together 
0.64 0.48 0 1 340,669 
Divorced, 
separated, 
widowed 
0.11 0.32 0 1 340,669 
Secular 0.18 0.38 0 1 328,570 
Linguistic 
minority 
0.26 0.44 0 1 267,499 
Country-level variables 
Gini (post tax) 0.38 0.09 0.16 0.59 328,942 
Population (in 
millions) 
107.38 245.43 0.83 1,330 341,262 
GDP (in 
millions 2005 
$US) 
878,705 873,560.2 3,717.45 12,832,781 338,286 
Democracy 0.73 0.29 0 1 333,760 
Conflict in 
previous 5 years 
0.66 0.47 0 1 343,565 
Conscription 
military 
0.64 0.48 0 1 321,195 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
(ELF1961) 
0.44 0.28 0.003 0.909 288,999 
 
A.3 Full regression results 
A.3.1 Main results 
In this section, we present the full regression table of our main results. The odd columns 
in Table A.33 report results of the full sample (male and female respondents), and the 
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even columns report results based on male respondents. In the paper, we present results 
based on male respondents only (Table 1). Here, we also add the coefficients of the 
control variables that we do not report in the paper.  
A.3.2 Predicted probabilities based on the full sample 
In the paper, we present predicted probabilities for male respondents only (Table 2). 
Here, we also report predicted probabilities based on the full sample (Column 9 of Table 
A.3). We use –mimrgns—command in Stata to calculate the predicted probabilities. 
 The predicted probabilities based on the full sample are in Table A.4. The results 
show that when the inequality is low, there are no statistically significant differences 
between the various quintiles of income. In the male sample reported in Table 3 in the 
paper, when the inequality is set at its minimum level, respondents from quintile 1 were 
slightly less likely to say they are willing to fight for their country, compared to 
respondents from quintile 5.  
 When the inequality is high, the full sample results show a statistically significant 
difference (p<0.1) between quintile 1 and quintile 5, with the poorer individuals more 
likely to say they are willing to fight for their country. These results are more significant 
in the male sample (p<0.01).  
A.3.3 Standard errors adjusted for within-country clustering 
In the main text, we present results clustered at sub-national level (Column 5 of Table 1). 
In Table	A.	5, we show that these results are robust for clustering at country-level. The 
signs, the coefficients, and the significance levels are very similar to the results reported 
in the main text.
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Table A.3: Main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 All  Male  All  Male  All  Male  All  Male  All  Male  
Gini -0.58* 
(0.32) 
-1.77*** 
(0.37) 
-0.34 
(0.44) 
-1.68*** 
(0.50) 
-0.97*** 
(0.33) 
-2.53*** 
(0.40) 
-0.56 
(0.45) 
-2.33*** 
(0.52) 
-0.58 
(0.72) 
-2.57*** 
(0.79)  
Q1 -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.06) 
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.37*** 
(0.10) 
Q2 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
Q3 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.18** 
(0.08) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
Q4 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
Q1 × Gini     0.58*** 
(0.14) 
1.18*** 
(0.21) 
0.26* 
(0.15) 
1.05*** 
(0.22) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
1.04*** 
(0.27) 
Q2 × Gini     0.48*** 
(0.14) 
0.84*** 
(0.20) 
0.27* 
(0.15) 
0.64*** 
(0.21) 
0.27 
(0.20) 
0.700*** 
(0.26) 
Q3 × Gini     0.28** 
(0.14) 
0.56*** 
(0.20) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
0.35 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.20 
(0.27) 
Q4 × Gini     0.28* 
(0.14) 
0.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.26 
(0.16) 
0.45** 
(0.22) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
0.46* 
(0.25) 
Female 
Age 
 
Age2 
Married 
   -0.39*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
 
  -0.39*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
 
-0.39*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
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Divorced 
Secular 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
GDP (log) 
Pop (log) 
Democracy 
Conflict 
Conscriptio
n 
  -0.59*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.57*** 
(0.04) 
-0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
  -0.59*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.08) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.59*** 
(0.04) 
-0.21* 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.03) 
-0.62*** 
(0.08) 
-0.46* 
(0.25) 
0.34** 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.24*** 
(0.07) 
-0.61*** 
(0.09) 
-0.50* 
(0.27) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fe 
Clustered 
se                              
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant 0.9*** 
(0.1) 
1.6 
(0.1) 
21.4*** 
(1.6) 
23.2*** 
(2.4) 
1.1*** 
(0.1) 
1.8*** 
(0.1) 
21.4*** 
(1.6) 
22.9*** 
(2.4) 
27.7*** 
(4.8) 
29.0*** 
(5.5) 
N                 
(countries) 
239,232 
(91) 
117,095 
(91) 
216,955 
(87) 
107,605 
(87) 
239,232 
(91) 
117,095 
(91) 
216,955 
(87) 
107,605 
(87) 
198,149 
(83) 
98,288 
(83) 
F 207.80 91.96 209.35 82.27 199.26 88.44 201.77 78.87 92.74 38.09 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (9) and (10) report 
robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within country. The odd-numbered models include all observations, and the even-number 
models include only male respondents. All results include country and survey fixed effects.  
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Table A.4: Predicted probabilities of Willingness to Fight=”yes” – full sample  
 (1) 
Low Inequality 
(2) 
High Inequality 
 
 
Predicted 
Probability 
St. Err. p>|t| 95% CI Predicted 
Probability 
St. Err. p>|t| 95% CI 
Q1 0.747 0.035 0.000 [0.678  0.816] 0.706 0.048 0.000 [0.613  0.800]  
Q2 0.744 0.034  0.000 [0.677  0.811] 0.709  0.046  0.000  [0.619  0.799]  
Q3 0.758  0.033 0.000  [0.692  0.824] 0.697  0.048 0.000 [0.603  0.790] 
Q4 0.746  0.035  0.000  [0.678  0.815] 0.703  0.048  0.000  [0.609  0.796]  
Q5 0.744  0.035  0.000  [0.675  0.813] 0.676  0.049 0.000  [0.580  0.772] 
Notes: This table reports estimates for the full sample of respondents using the results in Column 9 in Table A.3. Predicted 
probabilities are calculated using the –mimrgns- command in Stata, setting net Gini at its minimum (low inequality) and at its 
maximum (high inequality), and keeping the other variables at their real values.   
There is a statistically significant (90%) difference in high inequality between Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 (0.706≠0.676, p=0.08). The 
difference in low inequality is not statistically significant at acceptable levels.  
 
	 33	
Table	A.	5:	Main results – standard errors adjusted for within-country clustering 
Variable  
Gini -2.33* 
(1.34)  
Q1 -0.37*** 
(0.12) 
Q2 -0.20* 
(0.11) 
Q3 -0.08 
(0.10) 
Q4 -0.12 
(0.09) 
Q1 × Gini 1.05*** 
(0.29) 
Q2 × Gini 0.64** 
(0.26) 
Q3 × Gini 0.35 
(0.24) 
Q4 × Gini 0.45* 
(0.24) 
Individual 
controls 
Yes 
Country 
controls 
Yes 
Country fe Yes 
Survey fe 
Clustered se                              
Yes 
Yes
Constant 22.91*** 
(8.82) 
N                 
(countries) 
107,605 
(87) 
F 16897.87 
Prob > F 0.000 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors 
adjusted for within country clustering are in parentheses. These results are based on male 
respondents only. The individual controls include a gender indicator, age, age squared, 
three marital status fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respondent is secular. 
The country controls include log of population, log of GDP, democracy score, an 
indicator for whether the respondent’s country was involved in a conflict at some point 
within the five years prior to the survey, and an indicator for whether the respondent’s 
country has a conscription-based military. All results include country and survey fixed 
effects. 
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A.4 Robustness tests 
A.4.1 Regression tables for predicted probabilities in Table 3 in the paper 
Table A.6 presents regression results of our robustness tests. These results are based on 
male respondents only. Columns 1 and 2 use alternative measures of inequality (LIS Gini 
index and relative redistribution variable from SWIID, respectively). Column 3 repeats 
the main estimation in Column 10 in Table A.4, dropping outliers. Outliers are country 
years with unusually high number of missing values (90th percentile or more), or country 
years with unusually high or low level of willingness to fight (90th percentile or more 
and 10th percentile or less, respectively). Column 4 focuses on young males (aged 18-45) 
in democracies.  
Table A.6: Robustness checks regression results (male respondents) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LIS Gini  Relative 
Redistribu
tion  
Droppin
g outliers  
Young 
males in 
democra
cies  
Gini -1.67 
(1.12) 
0.60 
(0.66) 
-1.51* 
(0.83) 
-2.63*** 
(0.66) 
Q1 -0.49*** 
(0.14) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
-0.47*** 
(0.11) 
-0.49*** 
(0.12) 
Q2 -0.13 
(0.13) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.19* 
(0.11) 
-0.35*** 
(0.12) 
Q3 -0.03 
(0.13) 
0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.18 
(0.11) 
Q4 -0.07 
(0.13) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
Q1 × Gini 1.24*** 
(0.34) 
-0.68*** 
(0.19) 
1.33*** 
(0.29) 
1.50*** 
(0.30) 
Q2 × Gini 0.26 
(0.34) 
-0.50*** 
(0.18) 
0.67** 
(0.27) 
1.14*** 
(0.29) 
Q3 × Gini -0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.44** 
(0.18) 
0.24 
(0.28) 
0.60** 
(0.28) 
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Q4 × Gini 0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.29 
(0.18) 
0.39 
(0.26) 
0.49* 
(0.30) 
Female 
Age 
 
Age2 
Married 
Divorced 
Secular 
 
 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.16*** 
(0.03) 
  
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
GDP (log) 
Pop (log) 
Democracy 
Conflict 
Conscription 
-0.32 
(0.20) 
-1.67** 
(0.77) 
2.12*** 
(0.44) 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.65*** 
(0.09) 
-0.53* 
(0.28) 
0.32** 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
-0.35*** 
(0.09) 
-0.71** 
(0.28) 
0.68*** 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.28*** 
(0.08) 
-0.90*** 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
0.811** 
(0.41) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fe 
Clustered se                              
Yes 
Yes
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant 41.62*** 
(15.34) 
29.89*** 
(5.78) 
25.02*** 
(6.12) 
28.36*** 
(3.88) 
N                 
(countries) 
31,023 
(32) 
98,288 
(83) 
77,655 
(66) 
44,714 
(63) 
F  37.43 25.32 53.07 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual, based on male respondents. Quintile 5 is the 
baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. All results include country and survey fixed 
effects.  
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A.4.2 Robustness tests (full sample) 
Table A.7 presents results of robustness tests using full sample (males and females), and 
Table A.8 reports the predicted probabilities of these tests.  
Table A.7 Robustness checks regression results (full sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LIS Gini  Relative 
Redistribu
tion  
Droppin
g outliers  
Gini -0.52 
(0.89) 
0.24 
(0.61) 
0.69 
(0.78) 
Q1 -0.24* 
(0.14) 
0.07** 
(0.04) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
Q2 -0.05 
(0.12) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
Q3 -0.03 
(0.11) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Q4 -0.10 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
Q1 × Gini 0.76* 
(0.40) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
0.54** 
(0.25) 
Q2 × Gini 0.23 
(0.35) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
0.36* 
(0.22) 
Q3 × Gini 0.01 
(0.31) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
Q4 × Gini 0.44 
(0.32) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
0.29 
(0.21) 
Female 
Age 
 
Age2 
Married 
Divorced 
Secular 
-0.37*** 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.39*** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
-0.41*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.02) 
GDP (log) 
 
Pop (log) 
-0.05 
(0.18) 
 
-1.51** 
-0.62*** 
(0.09) 
 
-0.47* 
-0.46*** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.73*** 
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Democracy 
Conflict 
Conscription 
(0.62) 
2.40*** 
(0.38) 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
(0.26) 
0.37*** 
(0.14) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
(0.25) 
0.80*** 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.25*** 
(0.07) 
Country fe Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fe 
Clustered se                              
Yes 
Yes
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant 29.65** 
(12.46) 
27.83*** 
(5.22) 
27.56*** 
(5.56) 
N                 
(countries) 
63,196 
(32) 
198,149 
(83) 
156,976 
(66) 
F  76.90 54.38 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. All results include country and survey fixed effects.  
 In Column 1 in Table A.8 (using LIS Gini instead of Net Gini from SWIID), there 
are statistically-significant differences between quintile 1 and quintile 5 when the 
inequality is high (the difference between 0.673 and 0.602 is statistically significant, 
p=0.04).  There are no statistically-significant differences between the quintiles when 
inequality is low. In Column 2 (when we replace Net Gini with Relative Redistribution 
variable from SWIID), there are no statistically significant differences between quintile 1 
and quintile 5 (there are statistically significant differences in the male sample). Our 
results also hold for high inequality in Column 3, when we drop outliers (countries where 
the share of missing values is in the 90th percentile or higher; and countries where the 
percent of willingness to fight is especially low or high – in the 10th percentile or below 
or in the 90th percentile or above, respectively). There is a statistically-significant 
difference between quintile 1 and quintile 5, when inequality is high (p=0.01). There is 
no statistically-significant difference when inequality is low.  
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Table A.8 - Robustness checks – Predicted probabilities of Willingness to Fight = “yes”, based on Table A.7 (full sample) 
Inequality  Quintil
e 
(1) 
LIS Gini 
(2) 
Relative 
Redistribution 
instead of Net 
Gini 
(3) 
Dropping 
outliers 
 
 
 
 
Low 
Q1 0.643 (0.040) 
[0.564  0.721] 
0.715 (0.093) 
[0.532  0.897] 
0.670 (0.045) 
[0.581  0.759] 
Q2 0.668 (0.038) 
[0.594  0.741] 
0.721 (0.087) 
[0.549  0.893] 
0.681 (0.044) 
[0.594  0.768] 
Q3 0.679 (0.037) 
[0.607  0.751] 
0.725 (0.088) 
[0.552  0.898] 
0.670 (0.043) 
[0.614  0.785] 
Q4 0.667 (0.039) 
[0.592  0.743] 
0.699 (0.098) 
[0.506  0.893]  
0.685 (0.045) 
[0.597  0.773] 
Q5 0.668 (0.041) 
[0.587  0.749] 
0.681 (0.098) 
[0.487  0.874] 
0.682 (0.045) 
[0.594  0.770] 
 
 
 
 
High 
Q1 0.673 (0.065) 
[0.545  0.801] 
0.735 (0.069) 
[0.598  0.873] 
0.806 (0.038) 
[0.732  0.881] 
Q2 0.631 (0.067) 
[0.501  0.761] 
0.729 (0.069) 
[0.593  0.866] 
0.798 (0.039) 
[0.722  0.874] 
Q3 0.615 (0.067) 
[0.483  0.746] 
0.732 (0.070) 
[0.594  0.869] 
0.784 (0.041) 
[0.703  0.865] 
Q4 0.658 (0.065) 
[0.530  0.786] 
0.745 (0.069) 
[0.609  0.881] 
0.793 (0.040) 
[0.714  0.873] 
Q5 0.602 (0.075) 
[0.455  0.748] 
0.737 (0.068) 
[0.603  0.872] 
0.761 (0.045) 
[0.674  0.849] 
N (countries) 63,196 (31) 198,149 (83) 156,976 (66) 
Notes: This table reports the predicted probability of “yes” in response to the willingness to fight question; standard errors are in 
parentheses, and the 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. These results use all respondents. All regressions include 
individual- and time-varying country-level factors, survey wave and country fixed effects, and standard errors adjusted for clustering.
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A.4.3 Regression results with additional control variables 
In this section, we present regression results controlling for additional individual-level 
characteristics.  
In Column 1 in Table A.9, in addition to the standard controls, we include an 
indicator of whether a respondent is a college graduate and whether a respondent belongs 
to a linguistic minority group. To control for college education, we include a dummy 
variable equal to one if a respondent is a college graduate, and equal to zero if otherwise 
(we code this variable using responses to question X025 about education attainment). We 
control for respondents who are member of a linguistic minority group using the variable 
described above.  
In Column 2, we include attitudinal controls using questions from WVS about 
confidence in government (question E069_11), confidence in the armed forces (question 
E069_02), and pride of nationality (question G006). As explained in the paper, previous 
studies report a correlation between these attitudes, and willingness to fight, and we 
include them here on the right-hand-side of the equation to check if they alter our main 
findings. 
In Column 3, we report regression results without country fixed effects, explicitly 
controlling for country-level ethnolinguistic fractionalization measured in 1961.  
Our main results hold: the poor are less likely to respond affirmatively than the 
rich when inequality is low, and they are more likely to respond affirmatively than the 
rich when inequality is high. The differences are statistically significant with p<0.05, 
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except for Column 2 low inequality, when the difference is statistically significant with 
p=0.056. 
Table A.9: Robustness checks -- results with additional controls (male respondents) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Education and 
minority controls  
Attitudinal 
controls  
No country fe + 
ELF control 
Gini -1.05 (0.92) -0.23 (0.66) -2.08*** (0.21) 
Q1 -0.43*** (0.11) -0.29** (0.11) -0.45*** (0.09) 
Q2 -0.20* (0.11) -0.15 (0.10) -0.51*** (0.09) 
Q3 -0.08 (0.11) -0.09 (0.10) -0.26*** (0.09) 
Q4 -0.15 (0.11) -0.16 (0.10) -0.17* (0.09) 
Q1 × Gini 1.23*** (0.29) 0.85*** (0.30) 1.19*** (0.22) 
Q2 × Gini 0.59** (0.29) 0.47* (0.26) 1.28*** (0.22) 
Q3 × Gini 0.30 (0.29) 0.28 (0.28) 0.68*** (0.22) 
Q4 × Gini 0.47* (0.27) 0.44* (0.26) 0.53** (0.23) 
Age 
Age2 
Married 
Divorced 
Secular 
College Graduate 
Linguistic minority 
Confidence in government 
Confidence in armed forces 
Proud of nationality 
0.01*** (0.00) 
-0.00*** (0.00) 
0.07*** (0.02) 
-0.02 (0.03) 
-0.14*** (0.02) 
-0.05*** (0.02) 
-0.18*** (0.03) 
0.00*** (0.00) 
0.00*** (0.00) 
0.04** (0.02) 
-0.02 (0.03) 
-0.07*** (0.02) 
 
 
0.11*** (0.02) 
0.66*** (0.03) 
0.99*** (0.03) 
0.01*** (0.00) 
-0.00*** (0.00) 
0.11*** (0.01) 
-0.02 (0.02) 
-0.21*** (0.01) 
 
GDP (log) 
Pop (log) 
Democracy 
Conflict 
Conscription 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF61) 
-0.51*** (0.12) 
-0.47* (0.28) 
0.63*** (0.17) 
-0.13** (0.06) 
0.10 (0.08) 
-0.54*** (0.08) 
-0.03 (0.23) 
0.31** (0.13) 
-0.02 (0.04) 
0.07 (0.06) 
-0.09*** (0.01) 
0.10*** (0.01) 
-0.44*** (0.03) 
0.03*** (0.01) 
0.26*** (0.01) 
0.35*** (0.03) 
Country fe Yes Yes No 
Survey fe 
Clustered se                              
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant 25.09*** 
(6.81) 
15.98*** 
(4.71) 
2.25***  
(0.14) 
N (countries) 79,432 (79) 87,071 (81) 90,224 (81) 
F (Prob > F) 37.70 (0.000) 56.39 (0.000) 139.08 (0.000) 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual, based on male respondents. Quintile 5 is the 
baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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A.5 Explaining our findings  
Table A.10: Alternative explanations for the findings -- regression results (male 
respondents) presents regression results for the predicted probabilities we report in Table 
4 in the paper. In Column 1, we test whether poor are more proud of their nationality than 
the rich when inequality is high. We use the WVS question that asks respondents to 
indicate how proud there are of their nationality (question G006). The answers range 
from 1 (very proud) to 4 (not proud at all). We reverse this scale, such that higher values 
correspond with more pride. Additionally, we rescale the answers to lie between 0 and 1. 
We then use OLS regression to analyze whether income and inequality are correlated 
with nationalistic sentiments.  
 In Column 2, we examine the relationship between income, inequality, and views 
about necessity of war. We use the WVS question about whether, under some conditions, 
war is necessary to obtain justice (question H007). Possible answers are agree and 
disagree. We analyze this question using a probit model. This question appears only in 
round 6. Thus we do not include survey fixed effect. In addition, we do not include 
country fixed effects because inequality is a country level variable, and since we use only 
one wave, we cannot estimate this model with both inequality and country fixed effects.    
 Finally, in Column 3, we test whether threat perceptions account for our findings. 
We want to see whether poor individuals have a higher threat perception than the rich 
when inequality is high. To test for this possibility, we use the WVS question about 
whether the respondent is worried that their country may be involved in a war (question 
H006_03). The possible answers range from 1 (very much worried) to 4 (not at all 
worried). As before, we reverse the scale such that higher values correspond to higher 
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levels of concern. Also, we rescale the answers to lie between 0 and 1, and analyze this 
question using an OLS model.  This question appears only in round 6. As with the model 
in Column 4, we omit fixed effects. 
Table A.10: Alternative explanations for the findings -- regression results (male 
respondents) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Proud of 
nationality  
War necessary 
to achieve 
justice  
War 
likely  
Gini 0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.75 
(0.88) 
0.26 
(0.25) 
Q1 -0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.86*** 
(0.27) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
Q2 -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.47* 
(0.26) 
-0.00 
(0.08) 
Q3 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.51** 
(0.24) 
-0.00 
(0.08) 
Q4 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.37 
(0.24) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
Q1 × Gini 0.10 
(0.03) 
1.46** 
(0.70) 
-0.22 
(0.23) 
Q2 × Gini 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.60 
(0.68) 
0.15 
(0.21) 
Q3 × Gini -0.02 
(0.06) 
0.79 
(0.62) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
Q4 × Gini -0.02 
(0.05) 
0.67 
(0.61) 
0.27 
(0.20) 
Age 
 
Age2 
Married 
Divorced 
Secular 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.00*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
GDP (log) 
Pop (log) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
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Democracy 
Conflict 
Conscription 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
-0.17*** 
(0.06) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Country fe Yes No No 
Survey fe 
Clustered se                              
Yes 
Yes
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Constant 3.92*** 
(0.31) 
-2.06*** 
(0.57) 
1.20*** 
(0.12) 
N                 
(countries) 
113,941 
(83) 
29,950 
(42) 
30,608 
(52) 
F 112.55 8.05 53.07 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual, based on male respondents. Quintile 5 is the 
baseline. Standard errors adjusted for within country clustering are in parentheses.  
  
